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ABSTRACT 
The literature on the German hyperinflation is reviewed and arguments are 
presented why expectations were not rational during this episode. To overcome 
the simplistic assumptions of adaptive expectations, a "smart" form of 
adaptive expectations is used, in which the public extrapolates a local 
trend. The model is further augmented with a market adjustment equation. 
Estimates suggest this model is a more realistic representation of what 
actually went on than the Standard Cagan[1956] model. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Hyperinflation has generated an impressive body of literature over the years. 
There are some obvious reasons for this : as a phenomenon, it appeals to the 
imagination, and the fact that hyperinflations recur over and over again 
naturally stimulates interest in the question what causes them, and, more to 
the point, how hyperinflation can be stopped. 
The first and most famous hyperinflatory episode of this century took place 
in Germany after the First World War. Although it was only one of 5 severe 
inflations then wracking the economies of Central European states, it was by 
f ar the most spectacular, and the one which has generated the most interest. 
It was by no means the most serious hyperinflation of all time - that sad 
record is still held by the post-WW2 Hungarian hyperinflation - but it is 
certainly in the top five. 
Although studies of this episode started appearing almost as soon as the bank 
notes had stopped fluttering, the first econometrie attempt at analysis was 
made by Cagan[1956]. Now, 35 years later, we can regard this paper in the 
light of methodological insights gained since 1956, and note several severe 
weaknesses in the argumentation, but at the time it had an enormous impact, 
and it became the progenitor of an impressive body of literature Any 
reexamination must therefore s tar t by reviewing the literature on this 
subject, and since this literature is so extensive, the whole of section 2 is 
devoted to this exercise. In section 3 arguments against rational 
expectations are given and some alternative model forms are suggested, while 
section 4 contains the empirical implementation of this alternative strategy. 
Section 5 collects the main points and makes suggestions for further 
research. 
ï 
The author owes a considerable debt of gratitude to Margreet Schuit, who 
made several helpful suggestions. Responsibility for any errors remains my 
own. 
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2 . A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Before Cagan's classic paper on the subject, opinions on the German 
hyperinflation were roughly divided into two camps. The first school of 
thought, popular among German economists in particular, held that the 
hyperinflation was an imported phenomenon : it was actually the external 
value of the Mark which deteriorated so spectaculariy, and - through imports 
- this leaked into the German economy. The inflation was exacerbated by the 
German government's limited ability to fight it : most of its financial 
energy was drained by the Reparations payments. Oddly enough, nobody appears 
to have suggested that the Soviet Hyperinflation of 1920-1923 acts as an 
exception to this proposed rule : the rudimentary trade between post-Civil-
War Russia and the rest of the world and virtually meaningless ruble exchange 
rate did not stop hyperinflation in Soviet Russia, so the Soviet 
Hyperinflation must have been fueled by internal causes. 
The second theory placed the blame for the hyperinflation firmly with the 
German government. In this view, the government's policy of printing money to 
make up its deficits inflated the money stock to such a degree that the value 
of money plummeted. Here, it is the internal value of the Mark which is the 
first to collapse. Since the two theories are so closely intertwined with the 
matter of Reparations and the (perceived) German sabotage of the Reparations 
payment scheme, the question of whether the hyperinflation started inside or 
outside Germany is not without a historical and political significance, and 
tempers occasionally flared during this discussion. For good reviews, see 
Angell[1929], Bresciani-Turroni[1937], Ringer[1969] and Horsemantl988]. 
The first econometrically significant paper is Cagan[1956]. Since it served 
as the cornerstone of so many subsequent papers, the main features will be 
summarised here. 
Cagan postulates a time-invariant money demand function, of the form : 
(1) log(M /P ) = cc + £E O < 0) 
where M is nominal money stock, P is a price index and E is the expected 
inflation for the next time period. Inflation expectations are adaptive : 
(2) E = E _ + y(7r - E ) (0 £ r < 1) 
where TT is the actual inflation. The case y=l was excluded by Cagan : he 
derived (2) from a continuous-time model with a positive parameter S, which 
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is related to r : 1 - e = y, so that y=l corresponds to S=co. This is a 
subtle point, which is occasionally missed (see e.g. Webb[1983] p.437). 
Cagan tacked an error term onto (1) and tried various values of y for 
generating E and estimating (1) by OLS. The value of r which minimised the 
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sum of squares was then chosen. This procedure was used for data of six 
hyperinflatory episodes. 
A few stylised f acts about Cagan's estimation procedures and results should 
be noted. In the first place, there is a great risk of simultaneity bias, as 
M and P would seem to be jointly determined. This is a point raised by, among 
others, Jacobs[1975] and further discussed in Sargent[1976a,b], Jacobs[1976], 
Cagan & Kincaid[1977] and Jacobs[1977b]. Second, the results are very similar 
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for all datasets : high R , moderate value of y and very strong 
autocorrelation among the residuals. This latter ailment has spurred 
Khan[1975] to re-estimate (1) with an AR(1) error term, while Bisignano[1975] 
also tr ies an MA(1) term in a Bayesian analysis. Since the symptoms are 
reminiscent of "spurious regression" (a suspicion also voiced by 
Jacobs[1975]), we might wonder if the explosive processes of the 
hyperinflation are just as conducive to spurious regression as nonstationary 
processes. 
Thirdly, the periods with the worst hyperinflation had to be dropped from the 
regression as they were way off the regression line. Cagan speculated that y 
might not be constant, and that an increased value of y during the final 
months of the hyperinflation caused the aberrant values. This latter point 
has been further investigated by Khan[1977], who allowed y to vary with |Air|, 
and Jacobs[1977a], who chose a different adaptive scheme which boils down to 
a y proportional to VE. 
With the advent of the Rational Expectations school of thought, the adaptive 
expectations assumption (2) came under close scrutiny. In a very influential 
paper, Sargent & Wallace[1973] investigate the consequences of assuming 
expectations in (2) are rational. Both this paper and a sequel in 
Sargent[1977] lose much of their appeal when seen in the light of 
Salemi[1979], who tests the tenability of assuming both adaptivity and 
rationality for expectations and finds he has to reject this combination of 
t ra i t s . Saiemi & Sargent[1979] drop the adaptive expectations assumption. The 
Sargent/Wallace/Salemi approach has the big advantage that it eliminates any 
simultaneity bias by formulating a bivariate model for M and P, but some of 
the consequences of their model have been questioned, for instance in 
Friedman[1978] and Buiter[1987]. Both these papers note that the SWS model 
could also embrace hyperdeflations, a phenomenon on which, as Buiter notes, a 
marked scarcity of data has impeded empirical research! 
The Rational Expectations assumption has proved to be very alluring, and many 
subsequent papers assume RE as a matter of course. Examples can be found in 
Goodfriend[1982], Burmeister & Wall[1982,87], Huang[1984] and Kiguel[1989]. 
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A different line of attack has been spearheaded by Frenkel[1977], who 
questions the use of exponentially weighted inflation as an indicator for 
expected inflation. Via an efficiënt exchange market argument, he proposes 
the forward exchange ra te as an alternative indicator, while a later paper 
(Frenkel[1979]) corrects heteroskedasticity in the specification and examines 
the merit of yet more alternatives to holding Marks. Abel, Dornbusch, 
Huizinga & Marcus[1979] actually use both (2) and the forward exchange ra te 
as joint indicators of expected inflation. An attack on this approach by 
Salemi[1980] is parried in Frenkel[1980]'s rejoinder. 
Other papers investigate the presence of self-fulfilling price bubbles (Flood 
& Garber[1980a,1980b,1983], Hamilton[1986], Casella[1989]), the direction of 
causality between M and P (Hernandez-Iglesias & Hernandez-Iglesias[1981], 
Protopapadakis[1983]), the possibility that a monetary reform was actually 
expected, influencing inflation expectations (Flood & Garber, LaHaye[1985]) 
or the consequences of assuming different mechanisms for the formation of 
expectations (Evans & Yarrow[1981]). 
An interesting footnote to the original Cagan model is provided by 
Dufour[1986] who investigates the stability of the coefficients by recursive 
techniques. He finds considerable evidence that the coefficients in Cagan's 
model are not constant through time, not even in the shortened sample period 
Cagan used. 
Finally, several authors have applied Caganite models to other data sets. 
Interest in the post-WW2 Chinese and Taiwanese hyperinflations is still 
growing, while episodes of high inflation in Israël, Yugoslavia, Poland, 
Brazil, Argentina and Bolivia have also been subjected to Caganite scrutiny. 
It is worth mentioning that, in all this literature, there is no formal 
definition of hyperinflation to be found. Cagan formulates a rule-of-thumb : 
hyperinflation is everything over 507. per month, but his sample periods 
contain many months in which inflation was lower, to "increase the number of 
degrees of freedom", so this definition should apparently be taken with a 
grain of salt. 
Summarising, the Cagan model has been the foundation of a large number of 
papers. These papers examine variants of Cagan's model, said variants 
usually originating in the following areas : 
1. The specification of the demand function (1). Alternative measures of 
expected inflation, different functional form, different error structure. 
2. The formation of expectations. Adaptive, adaptive-rational, rational. 
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We might also wonder if there are points in Cagan's paper which have not yet 
been investigated in depth. One question which appears to have received 
little or no attention is whether the basic specification of the model (or 
indeed of any of the alternative models mentioned above) is tenable. 
Misspecification tests are almost completely absent from the entire 
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l i terature on this subject, with the occasional exception of a Durbin-Watson 
test statistic. The assumptions of normal disturbances, homoskedasticity and 
constant parameters, to name a few examples, have never been rigorously 
tested. Another assumption worth investigating further is the assumption that 
the "market for money" clears immediately through price adjustments. Only a 
money demand function is specified, and it really serves to explain price 
movements only : whatever the actual money stock, the price changes to ensure 
that (1) is satisfied. Only Hu[1971] and Kiguel[1989] introducé a market 
adjustment equation, and the latter only in a continuous-time, deterministic 
context. Duf our [ 1986 ]'s indications that certain coefficients might not be 
constant also gives food for thought. Finally, the fact that the most 
spectacular period of hyperinflation (August-November 1923) had to be 
excluded from the estimation as those observations were way off the 
regression line is cause for concern. Flood & Garber have developed models in 
which this is explained by assuming that people allowed an expected money 
reform to influence their behaviour, but since this is the only possible 
explanation in their models it should not come as a surprise that they arrive 
at this conclusion. 
The lone dissenter in the literature is Barro[1970], who formulates a wholly 
different model. Ho wever, the assumptions he needs to make to be able to 
implement his model empirically are rather severe, and, maybe as a result, 
his example has inspired virtually no other investigators. 
How could I have guessed the irony? I was sublimely ignorant of my 
personal future. 
Michael Moorcock, "The Laughter of Carthage" 
3. IN DEFENSE OF IRRATIONALITY 
From the above, it is clear that many authors have applied the Rational 
Expectations paradigm to this particular problem, but very few have actually 
Notable exceptlons being Chrlstlano[87], who rigorously examlnes the Cagan 
model under Rational Expectations, and Schult[1990], who applles a Caganlte 
model to varlous modern data sets 
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wondered if this assumption is tenable a priori. We recall that assuming 
expectations are formed rationally implies that the populace forms unbiased 
predictions of next period's inflation. We might therefore ask ourselves if 
this is realistic. 
There are in fact some very strong arguments against Rational Expectations 
during hyperinflations. The first argument is based on a simple act of 
imagination : imagine the situation of the average German consumer during 
this monetary merry-go-round. The German hyperinflation was the first episode 
of explosive inflation in, history. The only remotely similar experiences were 
the devaluation of the French assignat currency after the 1789 Revolution and 
the collapse of the Confederate Dollar in the later stages of the American 
Civil War. In other words, the German people had no precedents on which to 
base their responses. This is a stronger argument against RE than the 
oft-quoted observation that i t ' s unlikely the man in the street was able to 
generate unbiased forecasts if, after 70 years of introspection, 
econometricians still are not able to formulate a model which manages to do 
so : in this case, there are objective reasons to suspect the "man in the 
street" had no consistent idea what was going to happen next. While we might 
therefore assume that agents in later hyperinflations had learned 
sufficiently from the German example to form their expectations rationally, 
assuming rationality for the Germans during this episode is asking a bit 
much. 
Second, the German government certainly showed little ability to forecast 
consistently. A good review of German government policy can be found in 
Bresciani-Turroni[1937] and Merkin[1983], and the story is one of consistent 
underestimation of the problems involved and the actions necessary to solve 
them. To name one example which will assume extra significance later on, the 
quantity of banknotes produced consistently feil short of the needed 
quantities, while the inept fiscal policy is another example. In a different 
context, Schneidman[1970] has offered convincing evidence the Russian 
government also had little idea of what it was doing during its bout with 
hyperinflation. If the government - a very important player in the economie 
arena, was unable to act rationally or forecast unbiasedly, there is little 
reason to assume the consumers and/or producers were. 
Third, we must realise that we are in a very fortunate position. After half a 
century the worst errors have been removed from the data, and most of the 
important macroeconomic series are now available to us at the press of a key 
on the PC. However, the German agent was not so fortunate. The German 
government had a very imperfect knowledge of the various variables, and the 
same holds a fortiori for the German consumers and producers. Knowledge of 
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the model therefore isn't enough, we must also demand that the agents in the 
German economy knew the exact value of the various variables in the model 
even though the German government dld not\ 
Finally, there is another reason for not attaching too much weight to 
rationality in expectation formation. The demand that forecasts are unbiased 
limits itself to the first moment of the predictive density, but what of the 
higher moments ? Any restriction on the mean of the prediction becomes 
meaningless if the variance of that prediction is large enough, and I can 
think of fewer economie scenarios in which the uncertainty of the agents was 
larger than the German hyperinflation. Any "expected inflation" must have 
been accompanied by an uncertainty margin that grew rapidly as time went by. 
And if the uncertainty about next period's inflation is large enough, any 
restriction placed on the expected inflation becomes meaningless. 
In this paper I will therefore refrain from demanding rationality of the 
German people during their hyperinflationary delirium. On the other hand, 
assuming adaptive expectations may be doing the predictive abilities of the 
agents an injustice. The predictive properties of adaptive expectations as in 
(2) are well-known : if inflation becomes constant, expected inflation will 
converge to that same constant over time. If, however, inflation grows 
linearly in time, expected inflation will never catch up and will aiways, pun 
not intended, fall short of the mark. While I am willing to allow for 
irrationality among the agents in the German economy, I find it hard to 
defend these agents being so dense. If monthly inflation continues to grow, 
from 57. to 107. to 157. to 207. and so on, won't the German consumer/producer 
catch on and extrapolate a local trend to form his prediction for next 
month's inflation ? This would imply a Holt-Winters-type prediction 
mechanism: 
(3a) E = E + e + y (it - E - e ) 
t t - i t- i ï t t - i t- i 
(3b) e = e + r (n - E - e ) 
t t - i 2 t t - i t- i 
where e is the perceived change in inflation, the perceived slope of the 
inflation curve at time t. We may also consider the use of dummies to 
introducé specific events into the formation of expectations. The Ultimatum 
of London (June 1921) was generally recognised to be the death-blow to German 
public finances, and inflation shows a clear jump in June 1921, a jump which 
is otherwise inexplicable. In the above framework, we might postulate a dummy 
in (3a)-(3b) to catch this (apparently nontransient) jump in inflation and 
expected inflation. The murder of foreign secretary Walther Rathenau in July 
1922 was likewise foliowed by a notable increase in the speed of inflation. 
Stability of the parameters is also a point of concern. 
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4 . A MODEL FOR SMART, IRRATIONAL EXPECTATIONS, AND SOME ESTIMATION RESULTS 
The arguments presented in the previous section boil down to the following 
model : 
(4) log(Md/P ) = a + 0(E + e ) + u u iid N(0,tr2) 
(5) E = E + pe + y (ir - E - e ) 
t t - i * t - i "i t t - i t - i 
(6) e = e + y (rc - E - e ) 
t t - i 2 t t - i t - i 
Note that we have introduced a parameter p to allow for some reluctance in 
extrapolating trends. We will augme 
adjustment equation, as in Kiguel[1989]' 
extrapolating trends. We will augment the model further with a market 
,3 
(7) log(M /P ) = log(M /P ) + 5{log(Md / P _ ) - log(M /P _ )} 
Hu[1971] uses a slightly altered form in a study of the post-WW2 Chinese 
hyperinflation : 
(7a) log(M /P ) = log(M /P ) + S<log(Md/P ) - log(M /P )} 
V l* C~"X t™X 1» ^ v^X L^X 
However, this form assumes a more forward-looking money supply policy, and it 
lacks an advantage which (7) does possess, see below. 
Substituting this into (4) gives : 
(4') log(M/P ) = (l-S)log(M /P ) + a5 + 05(E + e ) + 5u 
t t to t - i t - i t- i t - i t- i 
Without further complications we can redefine parameters and write : 
(4") log(M/P ) = a* + 0*(E + e ) + 6*log(M /P ) + u 
&
 t t ^ t - i t - i 6 t - i t - i t 
The instantaneous market adjustment postulated by Cagan and most of his 
successors is approximated (but only approximated!) by the case 5 =0, a 
testable assumption. Note that the delay in the money supply equation has 
caused the irksome simultaneity in the reduced form of the model to 
disappear. This means that at least one shortcoming of the Cagan is avoided. 
However, in view of the criticisms listed in the previous section, we will 
have to examine this model carefully for misspecification after estimation. 
The reduced form (4") obscures the interpretation of the model somewhat. 
Basically, there are three processes at work here : 
1. The stable money demand function (4) 
3 
A similar adjustment function Is actually suggested by Cagan[56], who simply 
assumes 5 is large enough to guarantee almost instantaneous adjustment. 
However, as the changes in real cash balances were quite large, we may 
question this assumption, hence the more cautious formulatlon used here. 
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2. The "smart" inflation expectation forrnation (5)-(6) 
3. The adaptive money supply process. 
The lat ter can be seen as the government's expectation of next period's money 
demand. Making this expectation adaptive may be doing the government an 
injustice : here, too, we could postulate a Holt-Winters mechanism, allowing 
the government to learn from its mistakes. However, the anecdotal evidence 
supplied by Bresciani-Turroni[1937] strongly suggests that even the use of 
simple adaptive expectations may be overestimating the government's 
adaptability. 
The end result is a model in which both the private and the public sector are 
allowed to make biased predictions, a "tragedy of errors". 
During estimation we run into one further problem : the need to initialise 
the expectations with values E and e . While various ad hoc strategies 
o o 
suggest themselves, we will initially regard these two quantities as extra 
2 * parameters to be estimated, giving us 9 parameters in all. (p, 7 , 3- , <r , a , 
£ , S , E and e ) 
o o 
Estimation was by numerical maximum likelihood. Data used were monthly 
observations over the period 1919.01 - 1923.11, taken from Cagan[1956], 
giving us 58 observations. The last month of 1923 was deleted as the 
stabilisation took hold in that month, leading us into a situation in which a 
model for hyperinflation is not designed to function. During initial 
estimation runs it was found that the two initial expectation parameters are 
poorly identified by the data at hand. Substituting actual inflation in 
1918.12 and inflation growth between 1918.11 and 1918.12 gave results not 
noticably different in terms of other parameter estimates, likelihood, etc. 
to results obtained by Ieaving them as free parameters, so those two 
parameters were replaced by these ad hoc initialisations, Ieaving us with 7 
parameters. See Table 1 for estimation results. 
TABLE 1 
* * » 
coëfficiënt p y y a £ 6 
^ 1 2 
estimate (final) 0.81 0.20 0.08 -0.09 -0.08 0.70 
st.error (asymp.) 0.21 0.06 0.016 0.06 0.01 0.29 
R2 = 0.89 S.E. of regression = 0.30 Log(lik) = -7.15 
Some indication of the stability of the parameters can be gained by, if not 
recursive estimates, then sequential estimates. Three sample plots are shown 
as figs.1-3 (with 957. intervals). Both y and z show some jumpiness around 
the historically significant months of June 1921 and July 1922, but adding 
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dummies to (5)-(6) for those two months does not lead to coefficients 
significantly different from 0 ix LR-test value of 2.87). All other 
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parameters appear to converge to their final estimates quite well, and the 
tracking plot of f3 in fig.3 is fairly typical of the other parameters. We may 
conclude tentatively that the parameters in model (4")-(6) are stable over 
the sample period, although the informal nature of this test gives it little 
weight. The dog did not bark during the night, but whether this constitutes a 
curious incident is not clear. 
There is, however, a notable rising tendency in the estimate of p. This might 
indicate that the public became more and more willing to fully extrapolate a 
local linear trend. At no time is 0 within the confidence band around the 
estimate, which may be taken as an indication that the simple adaptive 
expectations assumed by Cagan are rejected for this more general alternative. 
The Cagan assumption of instantaneous market adjustment (5=0) is also 
rejected. 
Surprisingly - in the light of the persistent autocorrelation found in 
Caganite models - the residuals of this model show virtually no temporal 
structure. Tests for autocorrelation (up to lag 6), ARCH (up to lag 4) are 
nonsignificant at the 5% level, while an LM-test on heteroskedasticity is 
nonsignificant at the 17. level. A Bera-Jarque test on normality of the 
residuals gave a value of 3.99, also nonsignificant. This increases 
confidence that the expectation formation mechanism used here avoids the 
persistent underestimation of inflation which occurs when the simple adaptive 
mechanism is used. 
An interesting feature of the model is that it allows us to compare actual 
money stock and desired money stock (both in real terms). It turns out that 
in 32 of the 58 observations - virtually all during 1921-1923 - the actual 
money stock is less than the desired money stock. While a shortage of money 
seems paradoxical during a hyperinflation, this does tally with anecdotal 
evidence given by Bresciani-Turroni, who notes that the Reichsbank could not 
keep up with the demand for banknotes. No less than 30 paper milis were 
engaged in producing paper for bank notes during 1923, and even so, the model 
given here suggests the demand for money could not be met. The substantial 
drop in real money balances therefore has two causes in this model : lower 
demand because of expected inflation, and the government's inability or 
unwillingness to produce enough banknotes. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
This exercise is intended to make the f ollowing points : 
1. The assumption of Rational Expectations is highly dubious in the German 
context. On the other hand, the assumption of simple adaptive expectations 
does not do credit to the German public's ability to catch on to trends. 
2. The model presented here assumes smart adaptive expectations, which are 
not necessarily rational. The model fits the data satisfactorily and survives 
the usual misspecification tests quite well. In particular, little or no 
temporal structure remains in the disturbance term. 
3. There is some evidence the Ultimatum of London (June 1921) and the 
Rathenau Murder (July 1922) caused increased pessimism among the German 
public. However, a formal test procedure is unable to reject the hypothesis 
that these events did not cause significantly increased inflation 
expectations. 
4. There were considerable periods when the actual money real money stock was 
actually less than the desired money stock. This tallies with anecdotal 
evidence and supplies a second explanation for the observed drop in real 
money balances. 
There are several questions which need further research. The "smart" adaptive 
expectations mechanism chosen here is a very plausible one, but it is 
certainly not the only conceivable choice. Alternative mechanisms certainly 
need to be explored. Evans & Yarrow[1981] suggest three alternative 
mechanisms in a continuous time context, of which the third corresponds to 
(5)-(6) with p=l. We might think of a Markov-type model in which the public 
switches between different mechanisms. 
Second, is the Caganite demand schedule used here really all there is ? 
Although virtually all authors ignore non-monetary events, there were very 
definite events taking place outside the "monetary windtunnel" as well, the 
occupation of the Ruhr and the subsequent mass unemployment being just one 
example. Is there a way to fit the real sector into this model ? 
Third, can we dismiss exchange rates as a source of information altogether ? 
Why do they consistently lead inflation in 1920-1922, while inflation catches 
up to the movements in the exchange ra te druing the 1923 climax ? One 
explanation is that the German economy virtually became a dollar economy in 
1923, so that the exchange ra te and the Mark price index were the same series 
during that year. These considerations may not be very useful as a source of 
information, or they may be very useful : the model used here certainly 
ignores any information in exchange rates. 
Finally, the role of the German government in the model appears somewhat 
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oblique. A good review of German public finances can be found in Witt[1983], 
and it is not for the squeamish. Surely these extraordinary fiscal policies 
must have played a key role in the Hyperinflation ? We might think of a 
wholly different money supply function to replace (7). There is definite 
feedback from inflation to the budget deficit, as real expenditures remained 
constant or even increased (during the 1923 Ruhr occupation), while real 
expenditures collapsed completely (see e.g. Bresciani-Turroni[1937]). Also, 
the German government used the Reichsbank as a more or less willing tooi to 
convert these deficits into money : the percentage of the deficit financed by 
the Reichsbank increased to nearly 100% as the public became less and less 
interested in buying government bonds. This suggests a causal link : 
inflation > increased real deficit and less interest in government 
bonds > rapid increase in money stock 
However, this link appears to be highly nonlinear. Attempts to replace (7) by 
a mechanism as described above foundered on the high number of parameters 
necessary to fit this process satisfactorily. A more satifactory way to model 
this is urgently needed. 
These questions ensure that the list of references given at the end of this 
paper will continue to grow, if not exponentially like the German price 
index, then at least at a healthy pace. 
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